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CURRENT LEGISLATION
Editor-BERNARD E. DOCHERTY
SUSPENSION OF. THE POWER OF ALIENATION.-"'The common
law Rule of Perpetuities grew out of the ordinary usages of the
community, and is fitted to them. A will drawn as testators gen-
erally wish their wills drawn does not violate the rule. The limit
of lives in being is a natural limit. The Rule strikes down only
unusual provisions. But the limit of two lives fixed by the New
York Statutes is an arbitrary limit. It cuts through and defeats
the most ordinary provisions." 1 Here we have, in the words of
Professor Gray, the foremost authority of his time on this most
difficult branch of the law, the main criticism which many have
found with the New York rules against the suspension of the power
of alienation. Bills, having for their purpose the correction of
evils which arise from the present laws governing future estates,
have been introduced at the present session of the Legislature.2 The
reform is proposed to be made in the following manner:
Real Property Law, Section forty-two to be amended to read:
"Suspension of the power of alienation. The absolute
power of alienation is suspended, when there are no persons
in being by whom an absolute fee in possession can be con-
veyed. Every future estate shall be void in its creation,
which shall suspend the absolute power of alienation, by any
limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than
during the continuance of a life or lives in being at the
creation of the estate and twenty-one years and nine months
thereafter. For the purposes of this section a minority is
deemed a part of a life, and not an absolute term equal to
the possible duration of such minority. Lives in being or a
minority in being shall include a child begotten before the
creation of the estate but born thereafter."
Section forty-three: This section to be repealed.
Section forty-five: This section also to be repealed.
Section forty-six to be amended to read:
"Contingent remainder on term of years. A contingent
remainder shall not be created on a term of years, unless the
nature of the contingency on which it is limited be such that
the remainder must vest in interest, during the continuance
'Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd ed. 1915), p. 567.
2 Senate Bills: Nos. 981 and 982, introduced Feb. 23, 1931 and referred
to the Committee on the Judiciary.
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of a life or lives in being at the creation of such remainder
and twenty-one years and nine months thereafter, or on the
termination thereof."
Personal Property Law, Section eleven to be amended to read
as follows:
"Suspension of ownership. Limitations of future or
contingent interests in personal property, are subject to the
rules prescribed in relation to future estates in real property." 3
These sections as presently enacted are as follows:
N. Y. R. P. L., Sec. 42: "The absolute power of alienation is suspended,
when there are no persons in being by whom an
absolute fee in possession can be conveyed. Every
future interest shall be void in its creation, which
shall suspend the absolute power of alienation,
by any limitation or condition whatever, for a
longer period than during the continuance of not
more than two lives in being at the creation
of the estate; except that a contingent remainder
in fee may be created on a prior remainder in
fee, to take effect in the event that the persons to
whom the first remainder is limited, die under the
age of twenty-one years, or on any other con-
tingency by which the estate of such persons may
be determined before they attain full age. For
the purposes of this section, a minority is deemed
a part of a life, and not an absolute term equal
to the possible duration of such minority."
Ibid., Sec. 43: "Successive estates for life shall not be limited, ex-
cept to persons in being at the creation thereof;
and where a remainder shall be limited on more
than two successive estates for life, all the life
estates subsequent to those of the two persons
first entitled thereto shall be void, and on the
death of those persons, the remainder shall take
effect, in the same manner as if no other life es-
tates had been created."
Ibid., Sec. 44: (This section would not be amended, but is given
here because of the reference made to it in sec-
tion forty-five.) "A remainder shall not be cre-
ated on an estate for the life of any other person
than the grantee or devisee of such estate, unless
such remainder be in fee; nor shall a remainder
be created on such an estate in a term of years,
unless it be for the whole residue of such term."
Ibid., Sec. 45: "When a remainder is created on any such life
estate, and more than two persons are named as
the persons during whose lives the life estate
shall continue, the remainder shall take effect on
the death of the two persons first named, as if no
other lives had been introduced."
Ibid., Sec. 46: "A contingent remainder shall not be created on a
term of years, unless the nature of the contingency
on which it is limited be such that the remainder
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At first glance, it would seem that this is merely a substitution
of the common law Rule against Perpetuities for the law in its
present form. But is this so? The common law Rule against Per-
petuities was one against the remoteness of vesting. It settled the
time within which a contingent remainder must vest in interest in
order to be valid. An interest was considered too remote which
depended upon a contingency which could possibly happen after the
specified period of lives in being and twenty-one years.4 It has
been repeatedly urged that suspension of the power of alienation
formed no part of the rule,5 while, on the other hand, the New
York Rule against Perpetuities expressly states that it is a rule
against the suspension of the power of alienation. Whether or not
it also includes the common law striction against the remoteness
of vesting is, to many, a moot question. 6  In 1909, Matter of
Wilcox 7 brought this question to the fore. Chief Justice Cullen,
to the consternation of not a few, engrafted the remoteness rule to
the suspension of the power of alienation rule, and held as void,
a remainder which depended upon a contingency which might not
happen within two lives in being. Professor Stewart Chaplin, on
whose work Chief Justice Cullen leaned for support of his views,
points out that the rule against remoteness has always been the law
in New York; that the Revisers 8 "instead of adopting one drag-net
must vest in interest, during the continuance of
not more than two lives in being at the creation
of such remainder, or on the termination thereof."
N. Y. P. P. L., Sec. 11: "The absolute ownership of personal property shall
not be suspended by any limitation or condition,
for a longer period than during the continuance
and until the termination of not more than two
lives in being at the date of instrument contain-
ing such limitation or condition; or, if such in-
strument be a last will and testament, for not
more than two lives in being at the death of the
testator. In other respects limitations of future
or contingent interests in personal property, are
subject to the rule prescribed in relation to future
estates in real property."
"Tiffany, Real Property (2nd ed. 1920), p. 591; Gray, Rule Against
Perpetuities, supra note 1 at 185. Professor Gray enlightens this statement
by the following example:
A devise to A. for life, remainder to his widow for life, remainder
over on the death of the widow. Here, the remainder over on the death
of the widow, if contingent until that event is bad, because A. may
marry a woman who was not born at the testator's death, and the re-
sult is not affected by the fact that A. is very old at the testator's
death.
'Tiffany, Real Property, supra note 4, p. 597; Walsh, The Law of Prop-
erty (2nd ed. 1927), p. 569; (1901) 1 Col. L. Rev. 224.
"Supra note 5; also Fowler's Real Property Law of the State of New
York (3rd ed. 1909), p. 276; (1901) 1 Col. L. Rev. 165.
194 N. Y. 288, 87 N. E. 497 (1909).
S New York Rev. Stat. of 1828.
CURRENT LEGISLATION
provision for the vesting of all future estates by the end of a pre-
scribed period, saw fit to classify future estates in several groups,
and then as to each group, to furnish a separate provision, some-
times in the one form, and sometimes in another, which in each
case does in fact result in making such vesting compulsory by the
end of the prescribed period." 9 The Court of Appeals, in a case
decided subsequent to Matter of Wilcox, held that a future estate
not limited to vest within two lives in being was void, although the
absolute power of alienation was not suspended.'0 It would seem,
therefore, that the present rule in New York provides that every
future estate must vest in interest within two lives in being, and
that the power of alienation cannot be suspended beyond that same
period. This, it may be seen, is not the common law rule.", The
suggested changes would affect only the period of time within which
the estate must vest and become alienable.
To many, a desirable result of the proposed legislation would
be the greater freedom that might be exercised in the making of
trusts. In New York, a trust to collect the rents and profits and
apply them to the use of a beneficiary, or beneficiaries, for life, or
for a shorter term, suspends the power of alienation; for a bene-
ficiary of such a trust is not allowed to convey his interest.' 2 In
those cases where there have been more than two beneficiaries among
whom the income was to be shared, the courts have assumed the
fiction of separate trusts, if the deed or will reasonably allowed of
such a construction. 3 This interpretation is applied both to real
and personal property.14  And yet, notwithstanding the use of such
a liberal construction, the intentions of numerous settlors are
thwarted.
The State recognizes the fact that its citizens should be allowed
some restraint in the disposition of their property, and it is submit-
ted that a restraint for a period of one generation does not unduly
affect the public interest. "Lives in being" is the measure of one
generation. There seems to be no sense or justice whatever in a
rule which says that a man may allow income to pass through the
hands of two of his children, but that thereafter, the principal that
furnished that income must vest in possession, despite the fact that
his remaining children, who also figured in the testator's well-
thought plans of provision, may be very immature.
'Chaplin, Suspension of the Power of Alienation (3rd ed. 1928), p. 289.
" Walker v. Marcellus & 0. L. Ry. Co., 226 N. Y. 347, 123 N. E. 736
(1919).
"Supra note 5.
N. Y. R. P. L., Sec. 103.
'Matter of Colgrove, 221 N. Y. 455. 117 N. E. 813 (1917); Matter of
Homer, 237 N. Y. 489, 143 N. E. 655 (1924) ; Matter of Trevor, 239 N. Y.
6, 145 N. E. 66 (1924).
1"Supra note 13; also Central Trust Co. v. Falck. 223 N. Y. 705, 120
N. E. 859 (mem. op. 1918), aff'g 177 App. Div. 501, 164 N. Y. Supp. 473(lst Dept. 1917).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The relatively small number of cases which reached the court
of last resort in this state within the last sixteen years may tend to
show that draftsmen are becoming sufficiently adept to avoid the
pit-falls; 15 yet, it can in no way be taken as an indication of an
attitude of contentment in existing statutory requirements on the
part of the community. The court, in its use of the fiction of sep-
arable trusts, has applied salve to a cancerous sore, and has effected
a partial healing. But the sore remains. It is true that it has been
in existence for over a century, but the commercial growth of the
State, especially the wonderful attainments of our trust and insur-
ance companies would seem to have focused attention in the last
few years upon the laws in question. The presence of these com-
panies, with their large resources, has encouraged people to leave
their property in trust. But these companies are ever careful to
keep within the bounds laid down by the statutes and the courts,
and the result is, that although a trust is created which probably
will never be contested, in a great many cases, it does not represent
the original and reasonable wishes of the testator.
Perhaps we would arrive at a fuller realization of just what
is the distinction in matter of time between "lives in being" and
"two lives" if we should refer for a brief moment to a mortality
table.' 6 Suppose, for purposes of illustration, that there are two
children, A and B, endowed for life with an income. There are
cross-remainders in favor of each. The ages of the children are
ten and twelve respectively, at the date of the testator's death which
is the date when the income will commence to run. We learn, on
referring to our table, that A, the younger, has an expectation of
life of forty-eight and seventy-two one hundredths years, while his
brother may look forward to forty-seven and forty-five one hun-
dredths years of continued life in this world. The income, in this
case, therefore, will continue for forty-eight and seventy-two one
hundredths years, or until the death of A. The trust, of course, is
valid both in New York and under the common law. Let us now
increase the number of children by one, C, whose age at the tes-
tator's death is fourteen. C, according to our table will be the first
to die, for the schedule gives him forty-six and sixteen one hun-
dredths years to live. His share of the income will then be equally
divided between the others. B will only enjoy this additional in-
come for approximately one year, three and one-half months. After
his death, B's original income only, under the New York Statutes,
will pass to A, while under the common law rules A would take all.
Section forty-two of the Real Property Law prohibits A from tak-
ing that part of C's income which was enjoyed by B; although
=' Finkelstein. Notes on the New York Rule Against the Suspension of
the Power of Alienation, (1930) 5 St. John's L. Rev. 1 (on p. 3 will be
found a list of cases involving suspension that have been decided by New
York Court of Appeals since 1914).
"'American Table of Mortality.
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from the figures given above, it may be seen that B will predecease
A by only a period of approximately one year, three and one-quarter
months. The New York Statutes, in effect say to this testator:
"You must not suspend the power of alienation of that part of- the
principal which produces the income that would pass from C to B,
by allowing A to enjoy it for a period of one year, three and one-
quarter months. That would be inimical to commerce." One is led
to believe that Section forty-two, which has the same reason for
its existence as has the common law Rule against Perpetuities-
the advancement of commerce unhindered by restraints 17 -is unduly
severe in this instance. Of course, if A were much younger than
B, there would be a suspension for a longer period during the third
life; but even if we should take ten and thirty-five as being their
respective ages, the prolonged suspension would last for less than
seventeen years. Surely, this cannot be considered as being so seri-
ous an extension as to necessitate the preclusion of the trust as to
the part in question. The additional suspension as to each part
would, in every case, be measured by the difference in expectancy
of life between the youngest beneficiary and the second owner of
the income, regardless of the number of beneficiaries.
Professor Finkelstein, in a recent and most convincing article,'8
has decried the need for a change in the present laws. It is his be-
lief that the purposes of the community and of testators, as a whole,
are being served, and that "while a few wills have failed that would
probably have been sustained under the common law rule, the situa-
tion is not sufficiently serious to justify a wholesale revision of our
rules against the suspension of the power of alienation." And that
"no doubt a carefully planned scheme of curative legislation de-
signed to put the fiction of separate trusts on a basis of positive
law would remove many obstacles that, now make the drafting of
wills a treacherous escapade." Our respect for the views of Pro-
fessor Finkelstein is illimitable, for we fully realize that they are
the result of years of deliberation upon the subject; and yet, despite
the fact that it was he who conducted us through the tortuous
labyrinths of vested and contingent remainders, the thought remains
that a change in the existing statutory scheme is to be desired. What
is there to recommend the period of two lives? It disregards the
number of persons presently alive towards whom the testator feels
beneficently disposed, either through motivation of duty, kindness,
or of charity. It subverts the intentions of the most cautious, and
it is heedless of the insignificant betterment of the public weal re-
sulting from its exactions. The measurement of "lives in being"
on the other hand, is so graduated as to be commensurate with the
reasonable designs of the average benefactor and the welfare of
the state.
'Chaplin, Suspension of the Power of Alienation, supra note 9, p. 283;
Gray. Rule Against Perpetuities, supra note 1. p. 99.
"Finkelstein, Notes on the New York Rule Against the Suspension of
the Power of Alienation, supra note 15 at p. 10.
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The extension of the period of "lives in being" by the addition
of twenty-one years does not seem to have the same foundation of
reasonableness to recommend it, and could very well be discarded.
The extirpation of sections forty-three and forty-five, and the al-
teration proposed for section forty-six are, of course, necessary,
they being adjunctive sections to section forty-two in that they
carry out the scheme introduced by the Revisers to limit the sus-
pension to two lives in being. The recommended change in the
Personal Property Law would have the effect of placing trusts of
personal property on a par with those of real property. Such a
change would be in accord with recent enactments seeking uni-
formity in the disposltion of estates of decedents. 19
BERNARD E. DOCHERTY.
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY OF
CONFESSION AS EViDENCE.-"The law sedulously guards against the
introduction of irrelevant or incompetent evidence, by which the
rights of a party may be prejudiced." 1 The reason for this is not
difficult of comprehension. A litigant may reasonably demand that
a Court or jury determine the merits of his action, after hearing
only that evidence which is germane to the issue. Testimony which
is irrelevant, or worse, incompetent, serves no useful purpose at a
trial. Too often does but the mere allusion to testimony, which the
Court declares incompetent, create an impression on the minds of
the jurors which will react prejudicially against a litigant. Inevi-
tably the infusion of prejudice tends to deprive him of the fair and
impartial trial which the law accords all litigants. With unfailing
diligence our Courts must observe and follow "the meticulous rules
of evidence by which it is designed to have a case determined only
on first hand evidence bearing exclusively and directly on the issues
involved." 2
While it is stated generally that the rules with regard to the
admission of evidence are to be applied in civil and criminal cases,
alike, yet in criminal cases the necessity always exists for a more
rigid enforcement of these rules. 3 Professor Wigmore has stated
that:
"In criminal charges, the higher degree of caution al-
ways exercised by the law in favor of the accused prompts
to a greater strictness in excluding suspicious testimony." 4
"N. Y. Decedent Estate Law (1930).
'Williams v. Brooklyn Elevated Railroad Co., 126 N. Y. 96, 103, 26 N.
E. 1048, 1049 (1891).2 (1930) 4 St. John's L. Rev. 192.
'Wharton. Criminal Evidence (10th ed. 1912), p. 47, Sec. 24b.
'2 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd ed. 1923), p. 140, Sec. 822.
